Nonetheless, Green argues that Japan's desire for a leadership role in the region is not diminished-it will only grow stronger with time, and Japan will continue to develop initiatives with or without the United States. Green would prefer that Japan develop a regional leadership role with U.S. advice and consent. The key to this happening is policy consultation and coordination before either side makes an initiative. What is needed is a U.S. effort to engage Japan systematically. If the United States subcontracts certain roles to Japan, then Japan will have an outlet for regional initiative that will satisfy its desire for a higher leadership profile within the confines of U.S. global strategy.
Standing back from this argument, it is clear Japan's foreign policy is viewed primarily in relation to U.S. regional and global interests. It is not treated as an independent topic of intrinsic interest. From his tone, the author understands and is sympathetic toward Japan, but he seems mainly driven by a desire to harness Japan to better serve U.S. agendas. Academic concerns such as Japan's puzzling passivity and anomalous dependence on the United States, the roots of anti-U.S. sentiment in Japan, the continuing difficulty Japan has in truly normalizing relations with its neighbors, or the fundamental principles that will guide Japanese foreign policy are not the focus of attention. Instead, the book squarely addresses the question of what is to be done with Japan in the here-and-now if the United States is intent on running global affairs. It goes without saying that this kind of intellectual effort has been a key part of the development of Japanese studies in the United States. But it also must be said that the values and aims embodied in this kind of project are increasingly called into question in academic circles. Nevertheless, this book will have much value for U.S. government officials and policy analysts, and will be useful reading for academics interested in U.S.-Japan relations. Although Gramsci himself was far more interested in the flesh-andblood history of Europe, especially Italy, than in the faceless mechanics described by most contemporary scholars of international relations, he developed a critical concept-hegemony-that helps expose the social foundation of "soft power." Hegemony (or informally sanctioned authority) is acquired or secured by the ruling political alliance, which often includes intellectuals, the media, and private organizations associated with civil society (which is, for Gramsci, a dialectical parent and child of the state). The ruling alliance gains hegemony and thereby achieves the status of "historic bloc" (a melding of socioeconomic "structure" with political and cultural "superstructure") when it is able to manufacture public consent or construct mass legitimacy through the propagation of ideas, norms, and ideologies, thus enabling it to lead without necessarily deploying force. Hegemony, then, is distinct from domination, but can function alongside it like a velvet glove holding a fist.
Japan and the Reconstruction of East
Kelly's highly nuanced argument unfolds in three steps: (1) after World War II, Japan's ruling alliance acquired hegemony at home by building a historic bloc based on the promise of employment security, political representation, and peace; (2) beginning in the 1970s, various economic and political pressures (symbolized by the Nixon shocks, but operating together under the broad rubric of "globalization") conspired to shake the historic bloc; and (3) Japan's ruling alliance has rallied to protect and preserve the historic bloc by extending its reach into Asia, and by scrambling to establish hegemony over that region. (In the end, this sounds uncannily like the argument I make with Kozo Yamamura in Asia in Japan's Embrace [Cambridge University Press, 1996]-a fact that Kelly acknowledges in a footnote. The author, however, reserves a separate analytical space for himself by saying that Hatch and Yamamura fail to "consider adequately Japan's domestic social situation and its geo-strategic relationships, and especially that with the United States" [p. 180].)
Kelly develops the third and most intriguing part of his argument in Part III-a series of chapters that draw on Susan Strange's concept of "structural power," the power to shape the rules of the game, and that borrow her typology. 3 Thus, he examines Japan's emerging role in four "structures" in East Asia: production, finance (or credit), security, and knowledge (or ideas). The author recognizes that this organizational scheme rubs roughly against his Gramscian theoretical framework, which should privilege "knowledge" over all other structures, but he claims a synthesis is possible (for reasons that are not clearly given). I am less convinced. Gramsci's theoretical thrust is all but lost in Kelly's description of manufacturing networks (production), the internationalization of the yen (finance), and the sharing of national data on defense spending (security).
Indeed, the Gramscian logic driving this key piece of the argument lies almost exclusively in chapter eight ("Mapping Japan's Role in East Asia: Knowledge"), a meaty chapter in which the author suggests that Japanese elites operating in the region have promoted an "Asian way" of doing business that emphasizes lean and flexible production, along with selective intervention by the government in the market, and an "Asian way" of maintaining security through nonnuclear means. This knowledge structure is posited as a clear challenge to global (meaning American) ideas and norms. Using language that is reminiscent of Edith Terry, 4 Kelly asserts: "There is no doubt that the Asian way exists, if only as a rhetorical device through which to express difference and dissent" (p. 145).
In making this argument, Kelly must challenge the conventional wisdom that Japan has a "legitimacy deficit" in East Asia due to its militarist and colonialist past, its reputation as a neomercantilist power, and its track record of behaving as a reactionary state without a vision that can be universalized. He succeeds, for the most part, by noting that memories and reputations are transitory, but might have bolstered his argument much more by highlighting Japan's public relations success (relative to the United States) in responding aggressively, if slowly at first, to the Asian fiscal crisis of 1997-98. Unlike the United States, which was identified closely with the International Monetary Fund and its policy of demanding exceedingly strict and often counterproductive conditionalities in exchange for bailout loans, Japan provided an enormous amount of financial and technical assistance on a bilateral basis to hard-hit Asian states-with few strings attached. And before it was pressured by the United States to back down, Japan even called for a new institution, the Asian Monetary Fund, to deal with similar currency crises that might afflict the region in the future. Despite this quibble, I think Kelly makes an important contribution here, in chapter eight, by sug-gesting that Japanese elites have managed to present an alternative (counterhegemonic) model of economic and political development to their Asian counterparts, who have been more receptive than most Western, and especially American, scholars are willing to admit.
On the other hand, Kelly repeats the mistake that is often made by scholars working with intangible (nonmaterial) data: he sometimes confuses noisy but uneventful discourse with outcome-shaping actions. For example, he discusses the 1986 Maekawa Report commissioned by then Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, and suggests that it "signalled a shift away from the company-centric 'Japan Inc.' image of the Japanese economy and society towards an economy and society that served the needs of consumers and individuals" (p. 142). The report did, of course, call for such a shift in the political economy of Japan; but it did not actually produce any such shift because Japanese politicians and bureaucrats, concerned then about the impact of rapid yen appreciation on domestic exporters, chose to ignore its recommendations for structural reform and instead pursue macroeconomic policies (principally "easy money") that preserved the institutional status quo.
In addition, the book contains a number of factual errors, big and small. On the opening page, Kelly misidentifies Robert Keohane as a neorealist (he is a neoliberal institutionalist) and as an advocate of hegemonic stability theory (he is a critic).
5 On page 62, he mischaracterizes the political system in Japan by suggesting that "structural corruption" in the form of "money politics" led to the use of cabinet orders and other methods of "bypassing" the Diet. (In fact, the Diet-from faction leaders to backbenchers-has been the primary locus of "money politics" in Japan.) On page 97, Kelly goes too far in describing the "Big Bang" reforms of 1998 as "the effective dismantling of Japan's postwar financial structure." (This structure has been revamped but not dismantled-as evidenced by the still-underdeveloped state of the stock market, which is, even today, dominated by stable shareholders.) On page 141, he mistakenly suggests that Japanese economist Akamatsu Kaname introduced the metaphor of "flying geese," moving in a V-shaped pattern, to describe Asian regional development. (Akamatsu used the metaphor to describe the rapid growth of Japan's textile industry at the dawn of the twentieth century. Much more recently, Kojima Kiyoshi [an economist] and Ō kita Saburō [a bureaucrat] borrowed the metaphor for use in describing the region's development pattern.) And on page 146, Kelly speaks boldly of a "shared Confucian heritage" in East Asia, a description that might apply to South Korea, China, Taiwan, and even Singapore, but one that does not travel so well to most of the countries of Southeast Asia (such as Indonesia, where the population is largely Islamic; or to the Philip-pines, where the population is heavily Christian; or to Thailand, where the population is mostly Buddhist).
We might attribute these errors, except the first, to the fact that Kelly is more interested in global theory-building than in careful empiricism. He does not, for example, read Japanese and thus must rely on the sometimes imprecise langugage used in secondary materials. Or we might blame his editor for failing to subject the manuscript to a sufficiently picky level of peer review. In any event, the errors are not, in the aggregate, fatal, and do not detract from what is, overall, an ambitious and useful book.
Undergraduates with little training in international political economy will find this text too difficult to follow. But specialists, including graduate students, should appreciate it. I think they will find that Kelly has opened a new window on an old subject. 
Demographic Change and the Family in

Reviewed by Hikaru Suzuki Singapore Management University
In perfect unison, these two volumes demonstrate how contemporary Japanese people, communities, and the state attempt to counterbalance the nation's demographic disproportions. Demographic Change vividly reveals current demographic changes in Japan, namely, the increase in the aging population (kōreika), the low birth rate (shōshika mondai), and rural depopulation (kasoka). This work harmonizes demographic and anthropological studies while illuminating how people deal with these issues in their everyday lives. Family and Social Policy, by combining both political and historical dimensions, focuses on the state's response to demographic and family change and holistically unravels the problems underlying the implementation of Japanese social policies.
Occurring along with the demographic shift is a transformation in the reciprocal relations once valued as obligatory and part of filial piety by the Japanese. New forms of exchange and interconnection are taking place because parents' expectations of their children as well as children's own willingness to provide care for parents and in-laws are changing. Chapters in
